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ABSTRACT
This article compares and contrasts the various perspectives on rationality
and bounded rationality, and in doing so, advances two claims. The central
one is that the definition of rationality depends on bounded rationality. This
is reminiscent of debates in philosophy concerning the definition of concepts
in terms of their opposites, which has led to efforts to destabilise dichoto-
mies. In addition, as argued in this article, there is a related connection
between the (bounded) rationality of economists and the agents they study.
KEYWORDS Rationality; bounded rationality; economists; agents
JEL CLASSIFICATION CODES B1; B2; D01
1. Introduction
In the decades following World War II, the economics discipline was
characterised by the dominance of one research programme: neoclas-
sical economics (e.g., Davis 2003; Colander, Holt, and Rosser 2004;
Sent 2006). At the core of this programme stood the rational, self-
interested individual who maximised the satisfaction of her preferen-
ces, given her budget and given the prices of all the commodities.
Since the individuals in the economy were on an average rational in
satisfying their preferences, the economy as a whole, i.e., the sum total
of the individuals in the economy, would be in equilibrium.
Staring around 1980, the dominance of neoclassical economics
gradually faded and a pluralism of new economic research pro-
grammes emerged (Davis 2010). One of the most prominent new eco-
nomic research programmes has been behavioural economics
(Heukelom 2010). After a number of years on the margin of
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economics, this “new” programme of behavioural economics (Sent
2004a) became influential in the 1990s and developed into one of the
key contenders for replacing the no longer dominant neoclassical eco-
nomic theory in the 2000s. A central feature of behavioural economics
has been its — to economists — new use of the terms “normative”
and “descriptive”, namely: “normative” as the rubric under which to
discuss how one ought to behave if one wants to behave rationally
and “descriptive” as the deviation of the actual decision made by the
individual from the full rationality decision.
This article compares and contrasts the various perspectives on
rationality and bounded rationality, and in doing so advances two
claims. The central one is that the definition of rationality depends on
bounded rationality. This is reminiscent of debates in philosophy con-
cerning the definition of concepts in terms of their opposites, which
has led to efforts to destabilise dichotomies (e.g., Culler 2014; Derrida
1981). In addition, as argued in this article, there is a related connec-
tion between the (bounded) rationality of economists and the agents
they study.
In order to advance the two central claims, the stage needs to be
set. Only once it has been established that there are many interpreta-
tions of rationality and many versions of bounded rationality does it
become clear why the definitions of the two are connected and what
challenges economists face. The sense in which the definitions are
connected and the efforts to overcome these challenges are next elabo-
rated. The organisation of the article is, therefore, as follows. Sections
2 and three give a short overview of the different interpretations of
rationality and bounded rationality. Section 4 develops the two claims
in two subsections and the final section offers some
closing comments.
2. On rationality
Economics has always relied on some notion of rationality. In the
eighteenth century, economics was integrated into the great scheme of
the natural law and a rationalistic worldview (Daston 1987; Weber
1999[1904]). During this time, the moral sciences aimed to reveal the
rational grounds for action and belief. During the nineteenth century,
a transition took place from a psychological framework to a socio-
logical one. At the same time, the search for inexorable social laws
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replaced the computation of rational self-interest. However, economics
continued to cling to rationality. Throughout much of the twentieth
century, many economists would separate economics from sociology
upon the basis of rational or irrational behaviour (Samuelson 1947).
What has changed over time is the interpretation of rationality
(Sent 2008). While it was initially associated with self-interest (Elster
1989), in later readings, such as rational choice and expected utility, it
became linked with ideas such as consistency and indifference (Sen
1977). The most recent appeals to it include strategic aspects of
behaviour. Within macroeconomics, rational expectations economists
have taken rationality to its extreme, extending it to the formation of
expectations. Overall, interpretations of rationality cover a wide range
that includes it having the status of the axiom, a priori truth, self-
evident proposition, useful fiction, utopia, ideal type, analytical con-
struct, heuristic construct, indisputable fact of experience and typical
behavioural pattern under capitalism.
Rationality may be interpreted as either a positive or a descriptive
notion. Efforts to test rationality interpret the notion in a descriptive
manner. In short, rationality is presumed to characterise how people
actually go about the business of reasoning. By contrast, a normative
interpretation of rationality is concerned not so much with how peo-
ple actually reason as to how they should reason (Suppes 1961).
Others have interpreted rationality as a tautology or as pragmatic. It
is a tautology in the sense that any and all behaviour can be described
as rational. It is pragmatic in the sense that it is a useful organis-
ing category.
With rationality being such a central notion within economics, a
brief historical overview reveals the richness of the status of rationality
in economics. In the early nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill
(1984[1836]) argued that economics is an abstract science because it
reasons from assumed premises, such as rationality. In a similar vein,
in the early twentieth century, John Robbins (1984[1935]) argued that
the basic postulates of economics, such as rationality, are simple and
indisputable facts of experience. These insights came under serious
attack by Terence Hutchison (1984[1956]), who concluded that the
rationality postulate was treated as analytic by economists, meaning
that it is a priori true yet with empirical content. Instead, he claimed
that it must be synthetic, meaning that it must be stated in a testable
form (see Kant 1998[1781]).
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Hutchison’s arguments about the status of the rationality assump-
tion found a serious critic in Fritz Machlup (1984[1956]), who argued
that rationality is a theoretical construct. A contrasting perspective on
the status of the rationality assumption in economics came from
Milton Friedman (1984[1953]), who argued that assumptions are
largely irrelevant to the validation of theories. In his opinion, the role
of assumptions such as rationality is limited. They specify the condi-
tions of validity but do not determine these. They offer an economical
mode of describing or presenting a theory. An indirect evidence may
follow if assumptions are the implications of related hypotheses. In a
similar vein, Armen Alchian (1950) had argued that individuals who
act in a rational fashion will be successful and “selected” for survival
by the economic system. Karl Popper accorded a special status to the
rationality principle within his situational logic as “zero principle”
(Caldwell 1991).
Herbert Simon (1984[1963]) endeavoured to rescue interest in the
rationality assumption in economics by criticising Friedman’s so-
called principle of unreality. Simon argued that the unreality of prem-
ises is not a virtue but a necessary evil — a concession to the finite
computing agency of the scientist that is made tolerable by the prin-
ciple of continuity of approximation.
Having elaborated the sense in which rationality means different
things to different people in the present section, with Simon, we make
the transition to the next one, which illustrates that bounded rational-
ity also means different things to different people. Subsequently, we
turn to the sense on which economists have found their own heuristic
for cutting through the complexity in the notions of rationality and
bounded rationality in Section 4.
3. On bounded rationality
Starting with the occurrence of limited intelligence in 1840 and that
of finite intelligence in 1880 and through the appearance of incom-
plete, limited, and approximate rationality during the first half of the
previous century, we witness the eventual appearance of bounded
rationality (Klaes and Sent 2005). Both finite intelligence and approxi-
mate rationality suffered through a process of conceptual fading, in
which the expressions gradually ceased to be used. Limited intelli-
gence exhibited a conceptual renaissance when the hitherto marginal
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expression acquired a specific interpretation. Finally, we witness con-
ceptual switching from “intelligence” to “rationality” from the nine-
teenth to the twentieth century, during which the use of one concept
discontinued in favour of another.
Herbert Simon himself first appealed to “limited rationality” and
“approximate rationality”, which had both earlier occurred in political
discourse, before settling on bounded rationality. While refining and
replacing the original expressions, Simon tentatively connected
“boundary” and “rationality” into the concept that is the focus of the
present section. While Simon’s endeavours were strengthened by his
appeals to bounded rationality as a principle, subsequent authors
entertained different interpretations of this presume principle.
The boundedness is sometimes defined as a deviation from the
standard model (Sent 2004a; Harstad and Selten 2013). First, under
bounded rationality conditions, humans are faced with limited cognitive
abilities that constrain their problem-solving abilities. Second, bounded
willpower illustrates that people sometimes make choices that are not in
their long-run interest. Finally, bounded self-interest shows that humans
are often willing to sacrifice their own interests to help others.
The size of the deviation determines the extent to which economics’
conception of human choice needs to be modified (Rabin 1998; Rabin
2013). First, there is evidence requiring relatively small modifications
of the utility functions economists employ. This includes data illus-
trating that preferences are determined by changes in outcomes rela-
tive to a certain reference level. That is, decision-makers’ dislike for
losses outweighs their desire for gains. Also, evidence that people pur-
sue “other-regarding” goals such as fairness, reciprocal altruism and
revenge might not require a complete overhaul of the mainstream
model. The next set of insights focuses on biases in the judgment
under uncertainty and calls for a more radical overhaul of the stand-
ard model. These show that humans often infer too much from too
little evidence and misread evidence as conforming their hypotheses.
Finally, the most radical critique includes support for the insight that
people have difficulties evaluating their own preferences. There is also
confirmation of framing effects, preference reversals, and related phe-
nomena. There is evidence of self-control problems and a focus on
short-run gratification inconsistent with long-run preferences.
Despite bounded rationality meaning different things to different
people, or perhaps because of this, it is a central concept within
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behavioural economics. In turn, this field in and of itself also means
different things to different people. In particular, a distinction can be
made between so-called old and new behavioural economists
(Sent 2004a).
Old behavioural economists such as Herbert Simon and George
Katona share a dissatisfaction with mainstream economics and a
desire to develop an alternative. Since mainstream economics started
from a given utility function, old behavioural economics focussed on
discovering the empirical laws that describe behaviour correctly and
as accurately as possible. While the neoclassical approach established
a close connection between rationality and utility or profit maximisa-
tion, old behavioural economics scrutinised the implications of depar-
tures of actual behaviour from the neoclassical assumptions. Since
mainstream economics starts from given alternatives and known con-
sequences, old behavioural approaches begin with empirical evidence
about the shape and content of the utility function.
The roots of new behavioural economics may be traced to the
1970s and the work of Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, Baruch
Fischoff, Paul Slovic, and others. Starting from the perspective of
expected utility-maximisation and Bayesian probability judgments,
Kahneman, Tversky and their followers evaluated the cognitive char-
acter of conformity or deviation from these benchmarks. New behav-
ioural economists started from the rationality assumption that has
characterised mainstream economics and next analysed departures
from this yardstick, as opposed to developing an alternative one.
A central feature of behavioural economics has been its – to econo-
mists – new use of the term “normative” and “descriptive” (or
“positive”) (Heukelom 2014). Normative has been defined ethically in
economics at least since the publication of John Neville Keynes’ Scope
and Method of Political Economy (1890). In the normative domain,
one discussed what was good, fair, just or ethical in other ways
(Hands 2001, 30). Positive first of all meant not value-based and sec-
ondly referred in a general sense to the empirical basis of a value-free
science of economics. Behavioural economists, by contrast, introduced
to economics the definition of normative as used by behavioural deci-
sion researchers, mathematical psychologists, mathematicians, philoso-
phers and others, namely: normative as the rubric under which to
discuss how one ought to behave if one wants to behave rationally. In
addition, behavioural economists have claimed to be more empirically
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oriented than neoclassical economists with their focus on rationality
(e.g., Camerer and Loewenstein 2004). This returns us to the relation
between rationality and bounded rationality.
Following up on this short overview of the richness of the concept
of bounded rationality in the present section and the short synopsis
of the various interpretations of rationality in the previous one, the
article proceeds by arguing for its two central claims in the
next section.
4. You cannot have one without the other
Having now established the various definitions of rationality and
bounded rationality, the next step involves reading rationality and
bounded rationality through the lens of continental debates about
dichotomies to help stabilise the definitions of both. For that purpose,
the present section will substantiate the article’s two claims in two
subsections. First, the definition of rationality is argued to depend on
bounded rationality. Second, the related connection between the
(bounded) rationality of economists and the agents they study
is elaborated.
4.1. Definition
There are many instances of mutual dependence between rationality
and bounded rationality. These include game theory, rational expecta-
tions economics, zero-intelligence traders, ecological rationality, and
rational inattention, as illustrated in this subsection.
Consider game theory first. Herbert Simon (1957) was a staunch
critic of game theory, as marked by the quote: “the approach taken in
the theory of games … is fundamentally wrongheaded … in ignor-
ing the principle of bounded rationality” (202). Yet, surveying the
recent bounded rationality literature, John Conlisk (1996) observed:
“Game theorists have recently turned to bounded rationality with
enthusiasm” (681). What happened is that game theorist encountered
difficulties in defining rationality and turned to bounded rationality in
an effort to address these.
What were these difficulties (Rizvi 1994)? First, the folk theorem
illustrates the (very real) possibility of encountering multiple equilibria
in repeated games. Second, intuitively unreasonable equilibria may be
selected in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, the chain
THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 7
store paradox and the centipede game. Finally, Nash equilibria call for
requirements such as common knowledge that are so stringent that
they have resulted in theorems concerning the non-existence of trade
and the impossibility of “agreeing to disagree” about an event.
Subsequently, game theorists have looked towards bounded ration-
ality in their efforts to save the rationality of the Nash equilibrium
(Aumann 1997; Sent 2004b). First, bounded rationality functioned as
a dynamic for selection among multiple equilibria by promising to
“refine” equilibria. Moreover, the evolutionarily stable strategy concept
of evolutionary game theory may be viewed as a further refinement of
perfect equilibrium, one of the most common notions used to refine
the Nash equilibrium. Second, bounded rationality has been used to
rule out unintuitive equilibria in the prisoner’s dilemma game, the
chain store paradox and the centipede game. Third, the absence of a
fully rational treatment of knowledge may circumvent the no-trade
theorems by allowing speculative trade.
These attempts to strengthen Nash then lead to the apparently
paradoxical situation, according to Robert Aumann and Sylvain Sorin,
that “rationality in games depends critically on irrationality” (Aumann
and Sorin 1989, 37). A similar appeal to bounded rationality to define
rationality is found in rational expectations economics, to which we
turn in our next illustration.
As with game theory, Herbert Simon was no great supporter of
rational expectations economics, and vice versa. In Simon’s words:
“Jack Muth, in his announcement of rational expectations in 1961,
explicitly labelled his theory a reply to my doctrine of bounded
rationality” (Simon 1991, 270–271). Yet, addressing the problems sub-
sequently encountered within rational expectations economics,
Thomas Sargent later noted: “Bounded rationality is a movement to
make model agents behave more like econometricians” (Sargent 1993,
167). What happened is that rational expectations economists encoun-
tered difficulties in defining rationality and turned to bounded ration-
ality in an effort to address these.
These problems arose because rational expectations economists
sought to not only establish symmetry among economic agents but
also put agents, economists, and governments on an equal footing
(Sent 1997). These efforts led to a string of hurdles for rational
expectations economists. First, how can there be trade among eco-
nomic agents who are alike in the relevant dimensions? One
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suggestion, following a line of research started by Robert Lucas (1972,
1977) is that equilibrium probability beliefs differ and that agents
actually trade on the basis of different information. However, a whole
series of no-trade theorems overrule this common-sense intuition.
The second obstacle encountered by rational expectations economists
involved error term justification. In particular, close scrutiny of the
justification of error terms revealed that the econometrician needed to
be outwitted by the agents. As Lucas and Sargent (1981, xxii)
explained: “Errors in the estimated equation crop up perhaps because
the econometrician has less information than the agents, in some
sense, or else because the model is misspecified in some way.” Finally,
how can policy recommendations be made when agents, economists,
and governments are put on an equal footing based on rational
expectations? When policy recommendations are possible, symmetry
is impossible. The reason is that making recommendations for
improving policy amounts to assuming that in the historical period,
the system was not really in a rational equilibrium. When symmetry
is possible, policy recommendations are impossible. The reason is that
making the assumption that in the historical period, the system was
in a rational equilibrium raises the question of why we study a system
that we cannot influence.
Rational expectations economists have sought to invoke bounded
rationality to support rationality and tackle the hurdles described
above. In particular, incorporating bounded rationality opens up the
possibility of a trade, offers a justification of error terms and allows
policy recommendations (Sent 1997). Moreover, rational expectations
economists use bounded rationality to reinforce the rational expecta-
tions hypothesis by focussing on convergence to this equilibrium
through boundedly rational “learning”. They have also used bounded
rationality to deal with some of the additional problems associated
with rational expectations such as multiple equilibria and the compu-
tation of equilibria. While this article will return to the relationship
between economists and agents in the next subsection, it will first
offer a few additional, brief illustrations of its central claim concern-
ing the relationship between rationality and bounded rationality.
Consider the concept of the zero-intelligence agent, a widely-
employed characterisation in agent-based modelling, which had a
remarkable impact in both economics and finance. The supposed sim-
plicity of this kind of agent stems from the lack of strategy and the
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random behaviour. Gode and Sunder (1993), and many since then
have employed this device to illustrate the irrelevance of a high level
of sophistication in strategies and learning at the individual level in
achieving market level efficiency. In other words, it is rational to be
boundedly rational.
Likewise, ecological rationality claims that the rationality of a par-
ticular decision depends upon the circumstances in which it takes
place (Gigerenzer, Rodd, and Abc Reseach Group 1999). What is con-
sidered rational under the rational choice account thus might not be
considered rational under the “ecological rationality” account, and
vice versa? In particular, Gerd Gigerenzer argues that some observed
behaviour, although violating rationality principles, might be rational
in environments with specific characteristics. However, one ought to
violate the principles of rationality, in a boundedly rational fashion, in
order to act rationally in these environments.
A final, brief illustration of the rationality of bounded rationality
involves the theory of rational inattention (Sims 2003). This theory
analyses the effects of the cost of information acquisition on decision
making. As rational expectations economist Christopher Sims
explains, decision makers may rationally take decisions based on
incomplete information, rather than incurring the cost to get complete
information. Hence, yet again, it is rational to be boundedly rational.
As the various illustrations show, then the definition of rationality
depends on bounded rationality. In the closing section of this article,
we will relate this to debates in philosophy concerning the definition
of concepts in terms of their opposites, as well as to efforts to desta-
bilise dichotomies. However, first, the article addresses a related con-
nection between the (bounded) rationality of economists and the
agents they study in the next subsection.
4.2. Economists and agents
It could be argued that the focus on rationality on the part of econo-
mists is an illustration of their own bounded rationality. For rational
agents are easier to study for boundedly rational economists.
However, the assumption of rationality is a kind of heuristic for econ-
omists who are too boundedly rational to navigate the complexity of
their agents. This subsection will offer various illustrations of this
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intricate link between the rationality and bounded rationality of
agents and economists.
A first example concerns Herbert Simon’s collaboration with
George Holt, John Muth, and Franco Modigliani (Holt et al. 1960).
Only with strong assumptions was the team able to solve the prob-
lems at hand. According to Simon (1991), the team “satisficed by
finding the optimal policy for a gross approximation to the real
world” (167). Moreover, Simon further observed that John Muth
imaginatively saw this special case as a paradigm for rational behav-
iour under uncertainty. What to most in the Holt-Modigliani-Muth-
Simon research team was an approximating, satisficing simplification,
served for Muth as a major line of defence for perfect rationality. For,
as a result of his participation in the project, Muth found that it was
fairly easy to define and estimate the optimal forecast, which he did.
He called the resulting forecast, which was unbiased and had the
smallest standard errors, a “rational expectation”.
In total, Muth illustrated the rationality implicit in theories of
bounded rationality. With respect to bounded rationality, Muth
exposed the rationality hidden in the contributions of Grunberg, Holt,
Modigliani, and Simon. Whereas Simon saw the strong assumptions
made by the team as an instance of satisficing on the part of the
team, Muth used these as the starting point for his rational expecta-
tions hypothesis.
At the same time, (Muth 1961) further illustrated the bounded
rationality implicit in the existing formulations of expectations revi-
sions. Whereas economists had long understood that expectations
played a central role in driving the economy and that even the sim-
plest economic theory should say something about how people viewed
the future, they lacked a plausible theory of how expectations were
formed. The first attempt to model systematic expectations revision in
the light of new information was the hypothesis of adaptive expecta-
tions, which was based on the principle that expectations of the future
are formed by the experience of the past.
However, even though people with adaptive expectations were
thought to use their own forecasting errors to derive their next fore-
casts, no widely-accepted economic theory was offered to explain the
magnitude of the adjustment parameter. Moreover, relying on mech-
anistic backward-looking extrapolative rules, adaptive expectations
was criticised for overlooking the capacity of people to learn from
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experience. Finally, adaptive expectations economists fit models that
forecast better than agents because they allowed individuals to make
systematic forecasting errors period after period.
For Muth, the suboptimal use of available information in adaptive
expectations was hard to reconcile with the idea of optimisation that
was the foundation of most economic analysis (Sent 2002). In add-
ition, his rational expectations hypothesis got rid of asymmetry among
economists, econometricians, and agents, by starting with the idea
that individuals were inspecting and altering their own forecasting
records in ways to eliminate systematic forecasting errors. This
approach possessed the defining property that the forecasts made by
the agents within the model were no worse than the forecasts by the
economist or econometrician who has the proposed model. As a
result, it eliminated the remaining bounded rationality in theories of
rationality.
In short, within the adaptive expectations framework, economists
were boundedly rational in using mechanistic backward-looking
extrapolative rules. At the same time, economic agents were even
more boundedly rational because economists fit models that forecast
better than agents. Within the rational expectations framework, agents
were presumed to be just as rational as economists. They were mod-
elled as using the same general equilibrium models as theorists and
these models resulted in vector autoregressions that could be tested by
econometricians. However, error term justification requires bounded
rationality on the part of economists.
The reason for this is as follows (Sent 1998). Despite the explicit
stochastic nature of theorising and uncertainty, agents’ decision rules
are exact functions of the information they possess. That is, agents
know the equilibrium probability distribution. At the same time, the
econometrician has to convert the exact equations into inexact ones.
In the process, the econometrician faces estimation and infer-
ence problems.
While rational expectations economists and econometricians had
challenged adaptive expectations advocates for fitting models that
forecast better than agents, we now observe a reversal of the contested
asymmetry. When implemented numerically or econometrically,
rational expectations models impute more knowledge to the agents
within the model (who use the equilibrium probability distributions
in evaluating their Euler equations) that is possessed by an
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econometrician, who faces estimation and inference problems that the
agents in the model have somehow solved.
In an effort to address this asymmetry reversal, Thomas Sargent
(1993) sought to restore the balance by picturing agents, economists
and econometricians alike as being boundedly rational but converging
to rational expectations. Ironically, however, this left him with a new
asymmetry that emerged between him and the agents in his models.
Specifically, Sargent had to be smarter when he made the agents more
bounded in their rationality because his models became larger and
more demanding econometrically. Furthermore, the proliferation of
free parameters in the bounded rationality programme left him with
an asymmetry between economists and econometricians: “Despite the
compliment thereby made to their kind, macroeconometricians have
shown very little interest in applying models of bounded rationality to
data. Within the economics profession, the impulse to build models
populated by econometricians has come primarily from theorists with
different things on their minds than most econometricians” (Sargent
1993, 167–168).
As this subsection has elaborated, the (bounded) rationality of
economists and agents is complexly connected. It could be due to
their own bounded rationality that economists typically modelled
agents as being rational. Under adaptive expectations, economists
were boundedly rational, but agents even more so. The subsequent
move to rational expectations economics was inspired by a desire to
place economists and agents on an equal footing, with both being
rational. Yet, error term justification requires bounded rationality on
the part of economists, inspiring a move (back) to bounded rational-
ity. Subsequently, economists had to become smarter, because model-
ling boundedly rational agents are highly demanding.
To a philosophical reflection on the historical connections between
rationality and bounded rationality elaborated in these two subsec-
tions, we now turn in the final section.
5. Closing comments
Binary dichotomies or dialectical oppositions such as the one between
rationality and bounded rationality inhabit Western metaphysical
thought. Philosopher Jacques Derrida (1981) criticises these binary
oppositions for exhibiting “a violent hierarchy” in which “one of the
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two terms governs the other” (41). Indeed, these binary dichotomies
or dialectical oppositions typically implicitly privilege one term over
the other.
Economists have typically privileged rationality over bounded
rationality. As this article has illustrated in support of its central
claim, bounded rationality has been invoked to address concerns aris-
ing in relation to rationality. The next step would be to destabilise the
rationality-bounded rationality dichotomy and thereby disprivilege
rationality. In this vein, some have called for a new so-called holy
trinity in economics instead of the persistent focus on rationality,
greed, and equilibrium. For instance, David Colander, Richard Holt,
and Barkley Rosser (Colander, Holt, and Rosser 2004) support a move
to the broader trinity of purposeful behaviour, enlightened self-inter-
est, and sustainability. Similarly, John Davis (2007) argues for a focus
on social embeddedness, evolutionary processes, and mutually influ-
encing individuals and structures.
Instead of viewing rationality and bounded rationality in terms of a
binary dichotomy, then these calls make it clear that they form inte-
gral parts of an entwinement. As this article has illustrated in support
of its second claim, the rationality and bounded rationality of agents
is entwined with that of economists. That is, when economists are
boundedly rational, then agents need to be rational. When agents are
boundedly rational, then economists need to be rational. Yet, such a
claim also trades on the dichotomy that is in need of destabilisation.
The entwinement of which rationality and bounded rationality of
both agents and economists form integral parts cannot be grasped fully
by setting up oppositions. Indeed, perhaps such oppositions are mostly
an illustration of the bounded rationality of the author of the present
article. Hence, subsequent authors are encouraged to think of rational-
ity and bounded rationality in terms of constellations of thought. The
next step would then be to create new notions or concepts.
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